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A Widow's Might: Nakaya v. Japan and Japan's
Current State of Religious Freedom
fl

I. INTRODUCTION

While the ashes of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were still
settling, the Japanese, trying to come to terms with their first
military defeat in recorded history, suffered yet another blow to
their national identity: On New Year's Day, 1946, Emperor
Hirohito publicly denounced his divinity. Because the then
state religion, Shinto, deemed the Emperor to be a direct
descendant of the gods as well as the spiritual and political
leader of the country, the reverberations from this
announcement shook the already devastated Japanese
populace.' With t h e religious implications of t h e
announcement came significant social and political changes.
Prior to this time, religion and state in Japan had been
united through the imperial throne, and Japanese culture
reflected this merger. The Emperor's announcement, along with
political and legal restructuring effected by occupational forces,
created a legal separation between religion and the state that
had never before existed in Japanese society. The less formal,
cultural union of the Shinto religion and the Japanese state
was not so easily dismissed, however, and it continues to
influence both the popular and public concepts of separation of
church and state and religious freedom in Japan.

1. Although most Japanese today do not regard the Emperor to be a
descendent of the gods, many still display a sentimental loyalty to the throne, and
some retain their belief in the Emperor's divinity. Hideaki Kase, an author on the
Japanese Imperial Family, is not untypical of this group. In reference to the
current Emperor he has stated the following: "The English term 'emperor' is too
broad. He is a priest-king, the highest ranking Shintoist priest, half-god, half-man."
When confronted with the fact that the Emperor conceded that he was not divine,
Kase has responded 'Yes . . . but at American gunpoint. Suppose your God in
heaven was declared no longer God. Tennou [the Emperor] is still sacred. He is a
holy man, a shaman." Nina J. Easton, Shinto Meets Chanel: An Imperial Family
Steeped in Tradition Searches for a Clear Identity as Japan Struggles to Update
the Myth of its Chrysanthemum Throne, L.A. TZMES MAG.,June 6, 1993, at 16, 53
(quoting Hideaki Kase).
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This Comment focuses on religious freedom and the
separation of church and state within the context of Japanese
society, emphasizing the Japanese Supreme Court's decision in
Nakaya v. Japan.2 In that case, the Japanese Supreme Court
held that a government agency that had facilitated the Shinto
enshrinement of the remains of a Christian woman's deceased
husband against her will did not violate the Japanese
Constitution's religious guarantee. Japan's minority religions
almost universally oppose the court's decision. Some see the
ruling as a subtle governmental endorsement of Shinto as the
state religion, others see it as a step down the path to a
resurgent Japanese militarism.
As a background for understanding the role of religion and
state in Japan, Part I1 of this Comment will provide a brief
overview of Japan's religious foundations and the basic tenets
of Shinto, focusing on its influences on the Japanese
sociological and political framework. It will also briefly discuss
the origins of the Constitution of Japan and outline its
religious guarantees. Part I11 will discuss the Tsu City case,
the first Japanese Supreme Court decision to address the issue
of constitutional religious freedoms and the precursor to
Nakaya. Part IV will then analyze the Japanese Supreme
Court's reasoning in Nakaya. Part V will discuss Nakaya in
light of current American analysis of religious freedom
jurisprudence. Finally, Part VI will discuss the possible effects
of Nakaya on Japanese religious freedoms, discussing the
difficulties of its application in modem Japanese culture and
examining potential pitfalls that must be avoided in order to
ensure the maintenance of religious freedoms in Japan.

A. A Brief History of Japan and Shinto
The history of Shinto is essentially the history of Japan
itself, for out of Shinto arose the modern idea of much of what
is Japanese. According to ancient Shinto legend, Japan was
founded in 660 B.C. by Jimmu Tennou, a great grandson of the
2. Judgment of June 1, 1988, Saikousai [Supreme Court], 42 Minshuu 277
(Japan). For the benefit of English readers, the remainder of citations to the case
will refer to the following English translation: Judgment on the Enshrinement of a
Dead SDF OfFcer to Gokoku Shrine, 25 SERIESOF PROMINENT JUDGMENTS
OF THE
SUPREME COURT UPON QUESTIONSOF CONSTITUTIONALITY
1 (1991) [hereinafter
Judgment on the Enshrinement].
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Sun Goddess, Amaterasu. The lineage of emperors is said to
descend directly from Jimmu ten no^;^ thus Japanese emperors are considered divine.' The islands of Japan were also considered to be of divine origin, created and protected by the
gods? Such ancient folklore defines the historical traditions
and much of the modern culture of Japan.
Shinto has been described by one scholar as "a crude form
of polytheism, combined with animism, or nature ~ o r s h i p . " ~
Under the philosophy of Shinto, there exist a myriad of gods.
For example, there is a god (kami) for each city and village.
Oftentimes, special waterfalls, rocks, trees, and other objects
are also given the title of kami.
Ancestor worship is another important aspect of Shinto.
This practice-of particular importance in this Comment-is
thought to have been introduced into Shinto philosophy over
1000 years ago, possibly through the influence of the C h i n e ~ e . ~
Shinto places special emphasis on deceased imperial ancestors
and tribal deities who are considered to be gods and who are
worshipped at Shinto shrines dedicated to their memory? This
view of the spiritual world and of Japan's origins has been
deeply ingrained in Japanese culture from early on,' thus

3. Jimmu Tennou is considered by most scholars to have been an actual
historical figure.
4. See ROBERTK. REISCHAUER, EARLYJAPANESEHISTORY109-115 (1967).
The title Tennou is still used to address the emperor of Japan.
5. According to ancient Japanese records, the islands of Japan were created
when the gods of heaven commanded a male god named Izanagi and a female god
named Izanami to create a new land. The legend maintains that they reached
down fiom heaven and dipped a jewelled spear into the ocean. When they withdrew it, the muddy soil that dripped down from its tip formed an island. Izanagi
and Izanami are then said to have descended from heaven to this island, from
which they procreated the other islands of Japan, becoming its first inhabitants.
See KOJIKI [RECORD
OF ANCIENT THINGS], bk. I, chs. 1-11(712 A.D.), translated in
KO= 47-70 (Donald L. Philippi, trans., 1969); NIHONSHOKI [CHRONICLES
OF JAPAN]bk. I, pt. I (720 AD.), translated in NIHONGI 1-28 W.G. Aston, trans., new
supra note 4, at 107.
ed. 1972); REISCHAUER,
6. MALCOLM KENNEDY,
A SHORT HISTORYOF JAPAN
22 (1963).
7. Id.; see also H . PAUL VARLEY, JAPANESE
CULTURE 18-21 (3d ed. 1984).
8. This practice of ancestor worship differs somewhat &om common Buddhist
practice in Japan. The most common form of ancestor worship in most forms of
Japanese Buddhism focuses on the worship of specific, usually recently deceased,
ancestors whose remains are placed in a butsudan or Buddhist altar kept in the
home of the deceased's relatives.
9. For example, ancient stories speak "of Jimmu Tennou worshiping his
ancestor the Sun Goddess in his palace," which is thought to have been a "crude
wooden structure," serving the multiple purposes of imperial residence, center of
government, and religious shrine. KENNEDY,
supra note 6, at 23; see also KAREL
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shaping the culture and mind-set of Japan.
While Shinto was closely associated with Japanese culture
and government *om its beginnings, it was not until the 1880s
that they made their most notorious merger. As the Japanese
feudal system began to decline, the imperial family was promoted as the new rallying point for the loyalties of the people.
Political leaders and scholars promulgated a new constitution
in 1889,'~establishing the Emperor as the spiritual and political head of state." With this shift in power, a new form of
Shinto emerged. Elevated to the position of official state religion and "remodeled" to include ultra-nationalist teachings and
the Japanese warrior code of conduct," State Shinto was designated as a code of national ethics and rituals, and the Shinto
VAN WOLFEREN,THE ENIGMAOF JAPANESE
POWER274 (1989).
10. Now referred to as the Meiji Constitution.
11. The first portion of the imperial oath read:
We, the Successor to the prosperous Throne of Our Predecessors, do
humbly and solemnly swear to the Imperial Founder of Our House and to
Our other Imperial Ancestors that, in pursuance of a great policy co-extensive with the Heavens and with the Earth, We shall maintain and
secure from decline the ancient form of government.
MEIJI KENPOU[Meiji Constitution] Imperial Oath sworn in the Sanctuary in the
Imperial Palace (Japan 1889), in COUNTH. ITO, COMMENTARIES
ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE EMPIRE OF JAPAN
(M.Ito trans., 1889), reprinted in THE JAPANESE
LEGAL SYSTEM 16 (Hideo Tanaka ed., 1977) [hereinafter TANAKA].Articles 1 to 4 of
Chapter I of the Meiji Constitution read:
ARTICLE 1. The Empire of Japan shall be reigned over and governed by
a line of Emperors unbroken for ages eternal.
ARTICLE2. The Imperial Throne shall be succeeded to by Imperial male
descendants, according to the provisions of the Imperial House Law.
ARTICLE 3. The Emperor is sacred and inviolable.
ARTICLE 4. The Emperor is the head of the Empire, combining in Himself the rights of sovereignty, and exercises them, according to the provisions of the present Constitutions.
Id. at 18. The actual power and influence of the Emperor during this era is still
somewhat debatable and the actual extent of his influence may never be known.
Most scholars, however, appear to think that the Emperor functioned more as a
figurehead and a facade for the actions of government officials than as an autonomous military dictator.
12. Known in Japanese as bushidou. This warrior code includes the Japanese
caste system and undying obedience to feudal lord and country. Most readers will
be familiar with the practice of harakiri or seppuku, which is the ritual of killing
oneself by disembowelment in order to atone, for example, for disgracing one's lord
or honor. This was commonly practiced by those warriors (samurai) who had lost
an important battle or had committed some other serious violation of their code of
honor. The inclusion of many of these warrior class doctrines into the state version
of Shinto served to promote an extremely strong sense of nationalism. See, e.g.,
JOHN ALLYN, THE 47 RONIN STORY (1970); HERMAN
OOMS, TOKUGAWA
IDEOLOGY
(1985).

NAKlAYA v. JAPAN
beliefs regarding the creation and supremacy of Japan were
taught as unquestionable historical truth.13
This shift set the country on a course that would lead to its
military aggression in World War I1 and culminate in defeat
and surrender to the Allied Forces in 1945.Upon defeat, Japan
was placed under the control of the Allied Forces and was required to rewrite the Meiji constitution to address issues including human rights, the political supremacy of the Emperor,
and the wide-ranging effects of state Shinto." The Allied
Forces rejected the first draR, which was prepared by the Japanese, stating that it was "wholly unacceptable . . . as a document of freedom and derno~racy."'~Under the direction of
General MacArthur, a handful of American lawyers prepared
their own draft? This American draft became the foundation
of the current Japanese constitution." Among other radical
changes, this new Japanese constitution sought to clearly divide militaristic state Shinto from the operations of the newly
reorganized government." The Japanese Government estab-

13. KENNEDY,supra note 6, a t 15, 154. This was accomplished through compulsory curriculum in all public schools.
LAW 111-13, 122-24 (1992); see also Sugata
14. HIROSHI ODA, JAPANESE
Q. 365 (1988) (providing an overview of
Masaaki, Shinto Resurgence, 15 JAPAN
modern Shinto sects and their relations to state Shinto).
15. KYOKOINOUE,MACARTHUR'S
JAPANESE
CONSTITUTION
17 (1991) (quoting 1
NIHONKOKUKENPOUSEITEI-NOKATEI [THE MAKING OF THE JAPANESE
CONSTITUTION]322 (Takayanagi Kenzou et al. eds., 1972)); see also ODA, supm note 14, a t
112. The Japanese draft took approximately half of its articles directly from the
Meiji Constitution. It also retained the Emperor as the political head of the country, thus falling far short of the Allied Forces' democratic expectations. INOUE,
supra, a t 9-16.
16. This group consisted of Courtney Whitney, chief of the 'Government Section who was assigned to direct the constitutional reformation, and three members
of his staff: Col. Charles L. Kades, Lt. Col. Milo E. Rowell, and Comdr. Alfred R.
Hussey. INOUE, supra note 15, a t 16. The Allied Occupation Forces considered
Article Twenty, which deals with the role of religion in the Japanese state, to be
one of the more crucial aspects of the new constitution. Reacting to the Emperor's
complete control of both religious and governmental activities during World War 11,
the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers enforced a strong policy of separation of church and state during the postwar occupation. ODA, supm note 14, a t
THE ALLIED OCCUPATIONOF JAPAN
1945123. See genemlly WIIU.AM P. WOODARD,
RELIGIONS (1972).
1952 AND JAPANESE
17. For more information on the history of the Constitution of Japan, see
INOUE, supra note 15; TETSWA KATAOKA,THE PRICE OF A CONSTITUTION:THE
ORIGINOF JAPAN'S
POSTWAR
P O m c S (1991); ODA,supm note 14, a t 32-34, 111-15
(1992); TANAKA, supm note 11, a t 642-85.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 20-23; YOSIYUKI NODA, INTRODUC~~ON
TO JAPANESE
LAW 196-97 (Anthony H. Angelo ed. & trans., 1976). For a comprehensive discussion of the development, revision, and adoption of the religion clauses
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lished the Constitution of Japan (Kenpou) on May 3, 1947."

B. The Japanese Constitution's Religious Guarantees
The Constitution of Japan rejected several of the principles
of the prior Meiji Constitution. One of the more notable changes, Article Twenty, provided an express guarantee of religious
freedom:
(1)Freedom of religion is guaranteed to all. No religious
organization shall receive any privileges from the State nor
exercise any political authority.
(2) No person shall be compelled to take part in any
religious acts, celebration, rite or practice.
(3) The State and its organs shall refrain from religious
education or any other religious activity.20

Paragraph three is commonly referred to as the Institutional
Guarantee. Together with the second sentence of paragraph
one, it strongly implies that there shall be a clear separation of
church and ~ t a t e . ~The
' first sentence of paragraph one and
the sentence comprising paragraph two of Article Twenty provide for the fiee exercise of religion.22 The language of the
Constitution of Japan is much more specific than that of the
United States.23 This is undoubtedly due to the American
drafters' fears of a possible reunification of Shinto with the

in the Constitution of Japan, see INOUE,supm note 15, a t 104-59.
19. For an insight into the events involved in drafting the current Constitusupra note 11, a t 653-64.
tion of Japan, see TANAKA,
20. KENPOU [Constitution] ch. 111, art. 20, 1 3 (Japan), in TANAKA,
supra note
11, a t 6. For an introduction to the making of this constitution and the accompanying political maneuvers of both the Allied Forces and the Japanese, see id. a t
642-64.
21. Paragraph Three is analogous to the Establishment Clause of the United
States Constitution, which states that "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
22. In the two religious cases decided by the Japanese Supreme Court under
this constitution, these two sentences were analyzed together. These sentences are
analogous to the United States' Free Exercise Clause which states: "Congress shall
make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]." Id.
23. The specificity of the Japanese Constitution's religious guarantees might
imply that the Japanese Supreme Court is allowed comparatively less freedom of
interpretation than its counterpart in the United States. However, because the
Japanese Supreme Court has only reviewed two cases under this Article (Sekiguchi
v. Suminaga (The Tsu City case), Judgment of July 13, 1977, Saikousai [Supreme
Courtl, 31 Minshuu 533 (Japan); and Nakaya v. Japan, Judgment of June 1, 1988,
Saikousai [Supreme Court], 42 Minshuu 277 (Japan)), the extent of the court's
interpretative powers remains to be seen.
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Japanese State. Thus, the Constitution of Japan seems to mandate a complete separation of church and state in modern Japan.
The Japanese Supreme Court has only interpreted Article
Twenty on two occasions. Accordingly, the two cases addressing
the Article weigh heavily on the future of religious freedom in
Japan. The first case to address Article Twenty was Sekiguchi
v. S ~ r n i n a g aMore
. ~ ~ than a decade later, the Supreme Court
addressed Article Twenty again in Nakaya v. Japan.25

The Japanese Supreme Court first interpreted Article
Twenty of the Japanese Constitution in 1977, nearly three
decades after the constitution's adoption, in Sekiguchi v.
Suminaga, a decision commonly referred to as the "Tsu City"
case. In 1965, the City of Tsu held a j i ~ h i n s a when
i ~ ~ it commenced construction of a new municipal g y ~ n n a s i u m Seiichi
.~~
Sekiguchi, a Communist member of the Tsu City C o u n ~ i l , ~ ~
filed suit against the Mayor, charging that both the fees paid to
four Shinto priests for the jichinsai and the City's endorsement
of the ritual violated Article Twenty of the Constitution of Japan.29After a verdict in favor of the city in the Tsu District
Court, the Nagoya High Court reversed in favor of the plaintiff.30
24. Judgment of July 13, 1977, Saikousai [Supreme Court], 31 Minshuu 533
(Japan).
25. Judgment of June 1, 1988, Saikousai [Supreme Court], 42 Minshuu 277
(Japan).
26. A jichinsai is a Shinto ceremony performed to purify and dedicate a
building site and to ensure the safety of construction workers.
27. Judgment of July 13, 1977, 31 Minshuu at 533; see also TANAKA,
supra
note 11, at 735.
28. According to research by Keiichi Yanagawa and David Reid, most religious organizations in Japan can be classified as favoring a certain relation between Japanese religion and government. They suggest that groups tending to
prefer a policy of religious tolerance coupled with wide separation from government
activities include Joudo Shinshuu (a relatively modem, "reformist" Buddhist group),
the vast majority of Christians, and members of the many "new religions" currently
forming in Japan. Japanese Communists and members of other political and social
minorities are also generally considered to be part of this diverse group. See
Keiichi Yanagawa & David Reid, Between Unity and Separation: Religion and Politics in Japan, 1965-1977, 6 JAPANESE
J. RELIGIOUS
STUD.500, 504-08 (1979).
29. See TANAKA,supra note 11, at 735; Yanagawa & Reid, supra note 28, at
500, 512.
30. Judgment of May 14, 1971, Nagoya Kousai [Nagoya High Court], 630
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A. The Nagoya High Court's Standard
The high court used a three-pronged analysis to determine
whether the state action was religious. The court asked "[l]
whether the ceremony was conducted by a man belonging to
some religious sect, [2] whether the ceremony was performed
following an order set by a religious sect, and [3] whether the
ceremony was of such a nature as to be accepted by every ordinary person without any feeling of discord."31
In addressing the first two considerations, the court noted
that the ceremony was of ancient Shinto origin and until the
conclusion of World War 11, had been administered by the
Home Ministry, a government bureau which, before its abolishment, had dealt with the administration of Shinto shrines
and rituald2 The court, focusing on history, thus emphasized
the religious nature of the ceremony. In addressing the third
consideration, the court found that the jichinsai was accepted
by every ordinary person without discord.33
The court then held that a simple showing that a state
entity performed a religious activity or otherwise "assist[ed]" a
religion is sufficient to establish a violation of Article Twenty's
guarantee of the separation of church and state.34Under this
standard, the court held that the ceremony was not "of a purely
customary nature" and was thus a violation of paragraph three
of Article Twenty?

HANJI 8 (Japan). A partial English translation of this decision is contained in
TANAKA,supra note 11, at 735-37.
31. TANAKA,
supra note 11, at 736.
32. Id. The Home Ministry (naimu shou) was disbanded by the Allied Forces
in 1947.
33. The court did not question the validity or usefulness of this "discord"

inquiry in a society such as Japan's where the Shinto religion is highly integrated
into mainstream culture. This issue is addressed in part V I A , infra.
34. TANAKA,supra note 11, at 736.
35. Id. It is of great interest to note that in reversing the decision of the
district court, the Nagoya High Court also held that
it is not necessary to prove that there was any compulsion to attend a
religious activity. The fact that the state or a local public entity performed a religious activity is in itself a violation of [the] principle [of
separation of church and state]. The fact that the political power, prestige
and money of the state or a public entity are behind the public performance of a religious activity by a certain sect, in itself constitutes the
giving of assistance to that sect, brings it nearer to the position of an
established religion, and serves as an indirect pressure against other
religious groups and nonbelievers . . . .
Id. This holding was later rejected in its entirety by the majority in Nakaya.

N m Y A v. JAPAN
There are problems with this standard. Such a deep chasm
between religion and state could potentially deny any sort of
government assistance to religious groups. This would result in
a government position that is in fact hostile to religion rather
than one that is accommodative. In contrast, government assistance or accommodation would continue to be freely available
to other social or political groups simply because they do not
bear the stigma of "religion."

B. The Tsu City Decision
On appeal, the Japanese Supreme Court reversed the high
court's decision. The court declined to apply the Nagoya court's
three-pronged standard, creating a new standard based on "the
assessment of religion among ordinary people and the ideas
current in [Japanese] society."36Under this new standard, the
main considerations for determining whether governmental
actions violate Article Twenty were (1)whether the actions of
the governmental entity were for the purpose of propagating
religion (the propagation prong); and (2) whether the activity
interfered with other religions (the interference prong).37Using this standard, the court held that the ritual could not be
construed as being religious because it was not for the purpose
of propagating Shintoism and did not interfere with other religions.

C. Analysis of the Tsu City Standard
The supreme court's standard is superior to the Nagoya
High Court's. Instead of focusing solely on the religiosity of the
action, the propagation prong ensures that government actions
serving merely to accommodate religion will not violate Article
Twenty as long as the government does not intend to promote a
particular religion through its actions.
The supreme court's interference prong, however, is potentially over-restrictive. It is virtually impossible to publicly practice a religion without some interference with the belief systems of others. Some amount of toleration and accommodation
of others' beliefs is necessary to maintain the freedom of all

36. Yanagawa & Reid, supra note 28, at 513 (quoting Judgment of July 13,
1977, Saikousai [Supreme Court], 31 Minshuu 533 (Japan)).
37. Judgment of July 13, 1977, Saikousai [Supreme Court], 31 Minshuu 533
(Japan).

700

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNNERSITY LAW REVIEW [I995

religions; the Tsu City standard could be interpreted to ban all
governmental accommodation of public religious practice.
Furthermore, by basing the analysis upon "the assessment
of religion among ordinary people and the ideas current in
so~iety,"~the Tsu City standard exposes itself to the same
problem faced by that of the High Court. That is, by requiring
that decisions be based on societal norms, the standard potentially ignores minority voices.39 This standard stood unchallenged in the supreme court for more than a decade before the
issue of religious rights was again addressed in Nakaya v.
Japan.

IV. N

~ Y v.AJAPAN

A. Facts
Yasuko Nakaya lives in Yuda, a town on the outskirts of
Yamaguchi City near the southern end of Japan's main island.
In 1958, she was baptized into the Yamaguchi Shin'ai Church
of the United Church of Christians, joining the mere 1.4% of
Japanese citizens who consider themselves Christians." She
married Takafbmi Nakaya in 1959 in a ceremony involving no
religious rituals, and they resided in the city of Morioka where
Takafumi was a member of the Self-Defense Force (SDF) of Japan.*' Takafumi did not believe in any particular religiod2
38. Id. (English translation from Yanagawa & Reid, supra note 28, a t 500,
512).
39. See infra part V I A , which discusses in greater depth the problem of
confusing assimilated religion with culture. Because over 95% of the Japanese
population practices Shinto, it might be difficult for this standard to protect the
small minority whose religious ideals by definition exclude them from the category
of "ordinary people," and whose small numbers weaken their voice in the crescendo
of "ideas current in society."
40. 95.8% of Japanese practice Shinto, 76.3% practice Buddhism, 1.4% practice Christianity, and 12.0% practice another religion. These statistics reflect the
Japanese practice of observing multiple religions. Kaleidoscope: Current World Data,
February 20, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, KCWD File.
Christianity has experienced dark periods in Japanese history. After some initial acceptance, Japanese leaders turned against the foreign religion. Twenty-six
Christians were crucified in Nagasaki in 1597, and thousands of murders and other
serious persecutions continued into the early seventeenth century. Christianity was
officially outlawed in 1614. See VARLEY,supra note 7, at 146-49.
41. Judgment on the Enshrinement, supra note 2, at 3. The Self-Defense Forces evolved from the National Police Reserves which were created by Gen. Douglas
MacArthur in response to the onset of the Korean War. NORMAFIELD,IN TKE
REALM OF A DYING EMPEROR:JAPAN AT CENTURY'SEND 109 (1991). These forces
might be compared to the national reserve system in the United States with a
major exception being that the Japanese constitution forbids the Self-Defense Forc-
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In 1968, he was killed in an on-duty car accident and given a
Buddhist funeral at the request of his father. Yasuko later held
a Christian fbneral service a t her church.
Earlier, in 1964, the prefectural Veterans Association, a
private organization concerned with relations between the SDF
and the general public, had spoken with a Shinto priest regarding the possibility of enshrining the spirits of local SDF officers
who had died during service. This enshrinement would occur a t
a Shinto defense-of-the-nation (gokoku) shrine, whose preWorld War I1 function was to deify those who died in military
actions." Such shrines are wholly religious in nature? This
initial request for enshrinement was denied.
In 1970, during further discussions with the priests of the
shrine, the Veterans Association enlisted the assistance of the
prefectural Regional Liaison Office (the Regional Office), the
government body in charge of SDF affairs. The Regional Office
assisted the Veterans Association by (1) obtaining information
from other prefectures to determine their practices and opinions regarding such enshrinement, (2) sending requests to the
deceased officers' families for the documents and information
required for enshrinement, (3) soliciting donations from the
families for enshrinement fees, and (4) managing all donations
received. The Regional Office, a t the Veterans Association's
request, also drafted an application procedure for the enshrinement of SDF officers. During the negotiation process, an administrative officer of the Regional Office communicated directly with the chief Shinto priest a t the local gokoku shrine>5
During these negotiations, Mrs. Nakaya received communications from both the Veterans Association and the Regional
Office requesting vital statistics and documents necessary for
the enshrinement. Mrs. Nakaya repeatedly refused to provide
the information for the enshrinement and voiced her objections
during several telephone conversations with both organizations.
In March of 1972, the gokoku shrine agreed to proceed with the
enshrinement ceremony for the officers. Despite Mrs. Nakaya's

es from participating in any military activity other than in defense of their country. KENPOU [Constitution] art. M,'jj'j[ 1-2 (Japan).
42. Judgment on the Enshrinement, supra note 2, at 3.
43. For a brief history of gokoku shrines and their role in state Shinto as
well as reflections on the Nakaya case, see Sakai Takeshi, A Matter of Faith, 15
JAPAN Q. 357 (1988).
44. See Id.
45. Id. at 4-6.
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protests, the enshrinement was conducted on April 19, 1972.
Mrs. Nakaya later received a certificate from the shrine which
stated: "Offerings for the Sacred Eternal Prayer in memory of
Shinto Deity Nakaya Takafumi [are] solemnly accepted.
Hereafter, Memorial Services will continue to be held on the
12th day of January, eternally."46Mrs. Nakaya brought suit
against the government, alleging that the actions of the Regional Office violated the constitutional guarantee of separation of
church and state and deprived her of her personal religious
rights.47

B. Judicial History
The Yamaguchi District Court ruled in favor of Mrs.
Nakaya, holding that the government's cooperation with the
private Veterans Association was a substantial factor in the
shrine's ultimate decision to proceed with the enshrinement
ceremony and thus violated the separation of church and state
as guaranteed by the Constitution of Japan. The court also
held that the enshrinement "infringed on [Mrs. Nakaya's] legal
interest to live under a quiet religious atmosphere, or infringed
on her personal religious right."48Upon the government's appeal, the Regional High Court affirmed the district court's ruling. An appeal to the Japanese Supreme Court followed.

C. Holding of the Nakaya Court
In an unusually long and fragmented decision, the Japanese Supreme Court ruled fourteen to one to reverse the holdings of the lower courts. Reviewing the events leading up to the
enshrinement, the court determined that the enshrinement
"was basically realized through the efforts of the Veterans
A s s o ~ i a t i o n ,and
~ ~ that the Regional Office's activities had

46. Id. at 5-6. In the certificate Mr. Nakaya's name is written with the family name first as is customary in Japan.
The enshrinement ceremony consists of prayers for the deceased and a ritual
which transmits the soul of the deceased into a small piece of wood bearing the
name of the deceased preceded by the title god. Clyde Haberman, Shinto Is Thrust
Back onto the Nationalist Stage, N.Y. TIMES,June 7, 1988, at A4.
47. Judgment on the Enshrinement, supm note 2, at 4-7.
48. Id. at 7-8.
49. Id. at 9. The court stated that "the application . . . was made under the
name of the Veterans Association [andl was filed independently in its substance
and could not be regarded as a joint action of the Regional Office staff and the
Veterans Association, nor [could it] be considered that the office staff themselves
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only an "indirect relation with the religion."" Thus, the court
concluded that the government's actions were sufficiently independent from the Veterans Association's activities and were
constitutionally permissible. The court also rejected Mrs.
Nakaya's claim of a personal religious right.

1. The court's standard
The Nakaya court held that the term "religious activity
should not be construed to include any activities relating to
religion but . . . only the activity whose purpose has a religious
meaning and whose effect is to promote, to facilitate, to accelerate, to oppress or to intervene [sic] a religi~n."~'The court
made this determination based on a standard consisting of an
"objective0" decision that "follow[s] common sense" and gives
express consideration to "various factors such as place of the
action, the public's evaluation, intent, purpose and religious
feelings of those who act, its effect and influence to the general
public, e t ~ . " ~ ~
The court also held that even if the actions of the Regional
Office violated Paragraph three, "the institutional guarantee
does not guarantee the [sic] religious freedom itself directly to
individual persons, but rather it is an attempt to indirectly
guarantee the freedom of religion by setting forth the parameters of actions which the State and its organs may not conIn summary, the court held that when considering the
religious rights of individuals, religious activities of government
will not be considered to violate the Constitution of Japan unless the actions directly restrict or compel religious activities as
provided in the second sentence of paragraph one and in paragraph two of Article Twenty.
2. The personal religious right

Addressing Mrs. Nakaya's claim that she was entitled to
relief based on a "personal religious right," the Japanese Su-

applied for it." Id. at 9-10. The court did, however, find that there had been some
cooperation between the two entities, mostly in the form of clerical work. Id. at 9.
50. Id. at 11.
51. Id. at 10.
52. Id. (citing as the source of this standard Judgment of July 13, 1977,
Saikousai [Supreme Court], 31 Minshuu 533 (Japan)).
53. Id. at 11.
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preme Court again reversed the lower courts' holdings, finding
that the "religious personal right" or in other words, the "interest to live a religious life under a quiet religious atmosphere,'754could not be recognized as a protected interest under the Constitution of Japan.55

D. Analysis of the Nakaya Court's Decision
1. Separation of church and state: revision of the Tsu City
standard

In Nakaya, the court considered two factors in making its
constitutional inquiry into Article Twenty, paragraph three:
first, what is the permissible extent of governmental involvement in supporting religious activities, and second, what was
the purpose and nature of the government agency's action. The
court did not articulate a precise standard for the first factor,
but seemed to make its determination based on the particular
facts of the case. This factual inquiry addressed the question of
whether the application for enshrinement should have been
regarded as a joint action of the Regional Office and the Veterans Association.
a. The first factor: the scope of the actions of the Regional
Ofice. As previously stated, the court concluded that the
actions taken by the Regional Office could not be construed to
be a unified action with the Veterans Association. Nine of the
fifteen judges agreed on this point. The court reasoned that the
request for enshrinement originated with the families of the
dead SDF officers, the president of the private veterans group
was the primary negotiator with the shrine's chief priest,56
and the actions of the Regional Office Staff were only clerical in
nature.57 Based on these considerations, the majority held
that the enshrinement was "basically realized through the
efforts of the Veterans A~sociation."~~
The language of the court suggests that stricter scrutiny
may be applied to more directly collaborative efforts between
the government and private organizations with respect to religious activities. Thus, if the Regional Office had tried to direct-

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 12-13.
Id. at 11-14.
Judgment on the Enshrinement, supra note 2, at 9.
Id. at 9-10.
Id. at 9.
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ly persuade the shrine to go through with the enshrinement,
the court may have been more inclined to find the Regional
Office's involvement unconstit~tional.~~
In sum, the court suggested that indirect government involvement-specifically that
which is only clerical in n a t u r e i s not necessarily prohibited
by the Constitution's Institutional Guarantee.
b. The second factor: the constitutional effect of the action.
After discussing the permissible extent of government involvement in religious activities, the court focused on the purpose
and religious nature of the actions of the governmental agency.
The court stated that paragraph three of Article Twenty
"should not be construed to include any activities relating to
religion but to mean only the activity whose purpose has a religious meaning and whose effect is to promote, to facilitate, to
accelerate, to oppress or to intervene [sic] a religi~n."~'The
court set up a standard resembling the rule stated in Tsu City,
developing a non-exclusive list of considerations to be used to
determine the constitutionality of governmental actions involving religion. These considerations are: (1) the "place of the
action," (2) "the public's evaluation" of the action, (3) the "intent, purpose and religious feelings of those who act," and
(4) the action's "effect and influence to the general public. . . .*' Using these guidelines, the court concluded that
the actions of the Regional Office were constitutionally permissible.
The first and third considerations appear to focus on the
religiosity and purpose of the governmental action. The second
and fourth considerations seem to focus on the degree of religious divisiveness engendered by the action in the community
as a whole. Thus, in applying the new standard, the court
seems to have kept Tsu City's propagation analysis while aban-

59. This would seem to be similar to the excessive government entanglement
prong of the Lemon test, discussed infia, part V.A.
In Nakaya, there was some debate as to the extent of the influence of the
Regional Office's involvement. Some of the justices were concerned that the gokoku
shrine did not grant permission for the enshrinement until the Regional Office had
become involved in the proceedings. There was evidence to suggest that in addition
to the clerical responsibilities, the Regional Ofice's involvement served to convince
the shrine to go through with the enshrinement. The majority of the cqurt did not
agree with this assertion, however, and determined that the actions of the Regional
Office did not have a significant influence on the shrine's decision to conduct the
enshrinement.
60. Id. at 10.
61. Id.
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doning its interference analysis in favor of requiring a showing
of social divisiveness. The reason for the change in standards is
unclear. The Nakaya court did not explain its rationale for substituting social divisiveness for the interference factor.62
In applying its standard, the Nakaya court accommodates
some government involvement with religion by permitting
government involvement that does not promote, facilitate, accelerate, oppress, or intervene in a religion. The court specified
that a t least two kinds of government action fall into this category: those that have only indirect relations with religion (for
example, actions consisting of mainly clerical work), and those
that serve to promote secular purposes, such as raising the
morale and social status of employee^.^^ Nevertheless, the
court did not clearly delineate the actual extent of permissible
government activity.

2. The court's treatment of paragraph one, sentence two
Paragraph one, sentence two of Article Twenty provides
that "In]o religious organization shall receive any privileges
from the State nor exercise any political a ~ t h o r i t y . "It~ could
~
be argued that the shrine received a privilege &om the state in
the form of clerical assistance in violation of the second sentence of paragraph one. The court's determination that government actions must not serve to promote or accelerate religion
may be seen as the application of this constitutional principle.
However, the court did not mention this constitutional provision, and the exact implications of the second sentence of paragraph one remain unclear.65
The court may have determined that the terms "promote"
and "accelerate" are sufficiently broad to include the terms in
this sentence. On the other hand, a more direct application of
this sentence may add a new dynamic to the analysis by adding
the words "privilege" and "political authority" to the list of
unconstitutional effects of government involvement in religion.

62. The Nakaya court appears to have adopted the same standard they rejected eleven years earlier in their review of the Nagoya High Courfs decision in Tsu
City. The problems inherent in both of these analyses when applied to a society in
which religion is deeply assimilated into the people's cultural consciousness are
discussed infra, at part V1.A
63. Id. at 10-11.
64. KENPOU[Constitution] art. XX, 1 1 (Japan).
65. See Judgment on the Enshrinement, supra note 2, at 9-11.
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3. Mrs. Nakaya's free exercise claim

In addition to her Article Twenty, paragraph three claims,
Mrs. Nakaya asserted a cause of action based on a theory-previously untested in Japanese religious freedom adjudication-that might be characterized as analogous to a freeMrs. Nakaya
exercise argument in American jurispr~dence.~~
asserted that she was entitled to a "religious personal right"
under paragraphs one and two of Article Twenty. The first
sentence of paragraph one reads: "Freedom of religion is guaranteed to all."67 Paragraph two reads: "No person shall be
compelled to take part in any religious acts, celebration, rite or
practice."B8Together, these sentences ensure that individuals
in Japan are free to practice their religious beliefs.
a. The personal right of religious fieedom. Mrs. Nakaya
argued that she had a "religious personal right," which entailed
a legal interest in religious privacy and the ability to "live un'~~
arguments predder a quiet religious a t m o ~ p h e r e .Although
icated on "personal rights" are rare in Japan, they have been
used with some success in environmental litigation." Realizing this, Mrs. Nakaya seized the opportunity to present a "perThis argument
sonal rights" argument in a religious ~ontext.~'
was upheld in the two lower courts, but the Japanese Supreme
Court reversed.72The court devoted minimal analysis to the
claim, merely stating that Mrs. Nakaya's claims of a "religious
personal right [and a] right of religious privacy" had "no reason"73and that such a right could not be recognized under the
Japanese Constitution because Mrs. Nakaya had not alleged
"that any disadvantage was suffered because she did not attend
the ceremonies" nor had she made a showing that she "was
prohibited, restricted, suppressed or intervened in any way to

66. Aside from analysis in conjunction with the Institutional Guarantee in
Tsu City, the Japanese Supreme Court had never addressed a religious free exercise question until its brief discussion of "the personal religious right" in Nakaya.
67. KENPOU[Constitution] art. XX, 'I[ 1.
68. KENPOUart. XX, 'J[ 2.
69. Judgment on the Enshrinement, supm note 2, at 8, 13.
70. Karl Schoenberger, Japan Widow Loses Religious Rights Case, L.A. TIMES,
June 2, 1988, pt. 1, at 7.
71. Id.
72. This was not a surprise to Kenkichi Nakahira, head attorney for Mrs.
Nakaya, who stated: "We weren't surprised the Supreme Court didn't recognize it,
given its conservative bent." Id.
73. Judgment on the Enshrinement, supm note 2, at 13-14.
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believe in Christianity or to mourn her late husband based on
her religious faith."74
b. The court's analysis of the personal religious right. In
rejecting the religious personal right, the majority opinion
reasoned that "[tlhe guarantee of freedom of religion requires
tolerance for religious activities of others that are inconsistent
with the religion that one believes in as long as such activity
does not disturb his or her freedom of religion through compulsion or by giving rise to disadvantage^."'^ In his concurring
opinion, Justice Nagashima added that "it is constitutionally
required that a religion should tolerate activities of other religions and should not interfere with nor disturb them?
Only two justices, Sakaue and Ito (the lone dissenter),
failed to side with the majority on this issue. Justice Sakaue's
analysis of this issue is of particular interest. Although Justice
Sakaue would recognize a personal religious right "on the
grounds of infringement of religious feelings" in relation to an
enshrinement that is against the will of the plaintiff,77 he
would limit its application by (1)not recognizing the plaintiffs
legal right if the enshrinement was "based on the will of the
deceased himselcf18and (2) not recognizing a legal right when
other members of the family support the enshrinement and
there are no "special circumstances as to give priority to [the
plaintiffs] mental pea~e."~
Applying these standards, Justice
Sakaue concluded that Mrs. Nakaya was not entitled to legal
compensation or an injunction because some members of her
family-notably her father-in-law-had been supportive of the
enshrinement and because there was no reason "to give priority
to . . . the spouse of the deceased rather than to . . . the father."80 Although Justice Sakaue's standard would not have
provided relief in Mrs. Nakaya's case, it does recognize a free
exercise right. His proposed standard, however, may be problematic in that it requires extensive factual inquiry into the

74. Id. at 13. While the reasons for rejecting the "personal religious right"
claim appear to address standing issues, it is clear that the Nakaya court rejected
not only Mrs. Nakaya's assertion of the right, but also the validity of the right
itself. Id. at 13-14.
75. Id. at 12.
76. Id. at 15 (Nagashima, J., concurring).
77. Id. at 29 (Sakaue, J., concurring).
78. Id. at 31 (Sakaue, J., concurring).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 31-32.
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minds and intentions of family members. In addition, the standard could serve to exacerbate emotional divisions in families-a result almost universally held to be against public policyNakaya appears to be the only Japanese Supreme Court
case which addresses a free exercise claim. Based on the court's
analysis, it appears that while such a claim may eventually be
recognized, it faces a difficult path in obtaining full legal acceptance. The court is clearly more willing to analyze questions
such as Mrs. Nakaya's solely in the establishment context.

V. COMPARISON
WITH THE UNITEDSTATES'RELIGION
CLAUSE
JURISPRUDENCE
Despite its unique history and culture, the constitutional
religious freedom issues facing Japan are similar to those faced
elsewhere. For instance, many of the establishment issues
raised in the Nakaya case have been debated in state and federal courts in the United States. Because the Constitution of
Japan was drafted primarily by Americans and is interpreted
through a judicial review process similar to that in the United
States, some insight into Nakaya's reasoning can be gained by
comparing the standards used in each country.

A. The Lemon Test
Some aspects of the Nakaya standard bear a striking resemblance to the standard adopted by the United States Supreme Court for determining the constitutionality of state actions in the religious sphere-the Lemon test, established in
Lemon v. Kurt~rnan?~
In order to be constitutional under the
Lemon test, a governmental action must satisfy three separate
inquiries: (1) the action must have a secular purpose, (2) the
principal or primary effect of the action must be one that neither advances nor inhibits a particular religion, and (3) the
action must not constitute an excessive government entanglement with religion. This analysis has been applied to a wide
variety of Establishment Clause cases. In comparing the Lemon
test to the analysis used in Nakaya, this comment will focus on
the line of United States cases most analogous to the issue in
Nakaya-those dealing with the display of creches or other
religious articles on public land.
81. 403 U.S.602, 612-13(1971).
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Among the most significant cases addressing religious
displays are Lynch v. ~ o n n e l and
l ~ ~County
~
of Allegheny v.
American Civil Liberties Union.83In Lynch, the United States
Supreme Court held that a city's Christmas display of a creche,
along with other holiday symbols, did not violate the Establishment Clause. In County of Allegheny, however, the Court held
that a city's display of a lone creche at the top of the courthouse steps was violative of the Establishment Clause. The
Court applied the Lemon test in both situations.
In Lynch, the Court, applying Lemon's first prong, reasoned that there was a secular purpose for the display because
it was sponsored by the city in order to "depict the origins of
that Holiday? In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor compared the creche to legislative prayers and "the printing of 'In
God We Trust' on our coins," stating that such religious activities serve the secular purpose of "solemnizing public occasions,
expressing confidence in the future and encouraging the recognition of what is worthy of appreciation in ~ociety."~
Based on the Lemon holdings, it appears that the
government's actions in Nakaya would also pass the Lemon
test's first prong. The stated purpose of the actions of the Regional Office was to increase the morale and social status of the
SDF members. The morale and social status of military personnel are legitimate secular concerns of virtually all governments.
Additionally, it is apparent that the enshrinement would be
congruent with Justice O'Connor's statement. Just as legislative prayers or the display of a creche solemnize public occasions and encourage "recognition of what is worthy of appreciation in society," the enshrinement solemnizes the efforts of
those SDF officers who had died on duty and provides public
recognition of their sacrifice.
With respect to the second prong-that the principal or
primary effect of the government action neither advance nor
inhibit religion-the Lynch Court concluded that the display of
the creche did not have the principal or primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion because any advancement of
religion due to the display of the creche was "indirect, remote

82.
83.
84.
85.

465 U.S. 668 (1984).
492 U.S. 573 (1989).
Lynch, 465 U.S. 668 at 681.
Id. at 693 (O'Connor,J., concurring).
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and incidental."" The Court reasoned that the display of the
creche did not advance religion any more than the display of
religious paintings in public museum^.^'
In County of Allegheny, however, the Court held that the
display of the creche did advance religion. The Court gave great
weight to the fact that the creche was displayed on its own,
whereas the creche in Lynch was placed among other holiday
symbols such as Santa Claus and reindeer. In addition, the
Allegheny display had a large banner proclaiming "Gloria in
Excelsis Deo," and was positioned at the top of the courthouse
steps, a prominent public location.88Based on these differences, the Allegheny Court distinguished Lynch and held that the
second prong of the Lemon test was not met, thus finding the
display of the creche to be unconstitutional. County of Allegheny suggests that in the United States the public prominence of
the governmental actions and the message they convey are
important in determining whether the actions advance or inhibit religion.
The Nakaya court similarly looked at the underlying meaning and effect of the governmental action in making its determination. In Nakaya, the majority found that the Japanese
Constitution was not violated as long as the governmental
actions did not "promote, facilitate, accelerate, oppress, or intervene" in a religion. Despite the similar language of the two
standards, it appears that the Nakaya court's application of its
standard might allow the government greater liberties in its
actions. In Nakaya the government helped to facilitate a public
ceremony involving only one religion. The Regional Office made
no effort to contact other religious or civic groups even though
they too could perform ceremonies or give special notice to raise
the morale of SDF officers.
Singling out one religion appears to be contrary to the
United States Constitution as evidenced by Bd. of Trustees v.
~ c ~ r e a r y ,another
"
case involving the display of a creche. In
McCreary, the city council of a predominantly Jewish community refused to allow a coalition of Christian groups to continue
the placement of a creche in a public park. In holding this
refusal to be unconstitutional, the Court emphasized the impor-

86.
87.
88.
89.

Id at 683.
Id.
Allegheny, 492 U.S.573 at 598-602.
471 U.S.83 (1985), affg 739 F.2d 716 (2d Cir. 1984).
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tance of assuring that the park provide equal access to all religious and civic groups,g0implying that giving exclusive attention to one religion strongly suggests that the government
Thus, the Nakaya
action advances that particular religi~n.~'
analysis seems to be more permissive than the Lemon test in
that it permits governmental actions that accommodate one
particular religion exclusively, while the Lemon test, as applied
to the creche cases, does not.
The third prong of the Lemon test states that the government action must not result in undue governmental entanglement with religion.92In Lynch the Court found, based on several factors, that there was no undue government entanglement. First, while the city erected and maintained the display,
it did not contact any religious organization regarding the design or placement of the display. Second, the city had paid only
a nominal price for the display and had spent no other money
Third, the Court concluded that there
on its maintenan~e.'~
was no evidence of "comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state surveillance" or "enduring entanglement" referred
~ ~ Nakaya test similarly reto in Lemon v. K u r t ~ m a n .The
quires governmental actions to be only indirectly related to
religion, yet clearly allows for some expenditure of governmental time and funding, such as were expended on the clerical
activities involved in the Nakaya case.
Another factor U.S. courts consider in applying the excessive entanglement test is the political divisiveness of the situation. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court "has not held that political divisiveness alone can serve to invalidate otherwise permissible conduct."95 Thus, political divisiveness is not in itself a
90. 739 F.2d at 724-26.
91. See also Society of Separationists, Inc. v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916, 938-39
(Utah 1993) (expressing the need to assure that public funds and facilities are
accessible to all in order to avoid the promotion of a particular religion).
92. This is similar to the first issue addressed by the Nakaya court where it
held that indirect, clerical government actions were permissible.
93. 465 U.S. 668 at 684.
94. 403 U.S. at 619-22.
95. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 684. The concurrence stated:
Political divisiveness is admittedly an evil addressed by the Establishment
Clause. Its existence may be evidence that institutional entanglement is
excessive or that a government practice is perceived as an endorsement of
religion. But the constitutional inquiry should focus ultimately on the
character of the government activity that might cause such divisiveness,
not on the divisiveness itself. The entanglement prong of the Lemon test
is properly limited to institutional entanglement.

6911

NAKilYA v. JAPAN

713

prong in the Lemon test. In contrast, the Nakaya analysis requires a consideration of the action's "effect and influence to
the general public . . . .7'96 Thus, it appears that social divisiveness is a major consideration in determining the nature
and purpose of the government action in Japan. The extent to
which political divisiveness is encompassed within the concept
of social divisiveness, however, is unclear.
The analysis in Nakaya has much in common with the
Lemon test. They both seem to require that there be a secular
purpose behind the governmental actions. Each requires that
the government action not advance nor inhibit religion, although the Nakaya analysis seems to be more permissive in
that it accommodates governmental actions directed at a particular religion. Finally, both tests allow only minimal entanglement of government in religion. In making this determination
both consider the extent of divisiveness caused by the
government's action, but the Nakaya analysis seems to place
more weight on this factor than the United States Supreme
Court's analysis does.

B. Comparative Analysis Under the Endorsement Standard
Recent United States Supreme Court decisions indicate
that the Lemon test may be abandonedg7in favor of the endorsement analy~is.'~
This analysis makes a single determination: whether the government's conduct amounts to an endorsement of a particular religion or religious beliefs, or of religion generally. Because the test has yet to be adopted by a

Id. a t 689 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor concluded that "political
divisiveness along religious lines should not be an independent test of constitutionality." Id. The Court may have shied away from a political divisiveness inquiry due
to concern that litigants may "create the appearance of divisiveness" simply by
commencing a lawsuit. The litigant could then exploit the resulting divisiveness as
evidence of government entanglement. Id. at 684-85. I t may also be due to concerns over religious acculturation, a problem which is discussed infra part V1.A.
96. Judgment on the Enshrinement, supra note 2, a t 10 (citing Judgment of
July 13, 1977, Saikosai [Supreme Court], 31 Minshuu 533 (Japan)).
97. See Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2660-61 (1992); Texas Monthly, Inc.
v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989).
98. This test's main proponent and author is Justice O'Connor. For an indepth discussion of the pros and cons of the proposed standard, see Lynch, 465
US. a t 668, particularly the separate opinions of Justices O'Connor and Kennedy;
W. Scott Simpson, Comment, Lemon Reconstituted: Justice O'Connor's Proposed
Modifications of the Lemon Test for Establishment Clause Violations, 1986 B.Y.U.
L. REV. 465; William P. Marshall, W e Know It When We See It": The Supreme
Court and Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 495 (1986).
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majority of the Court, it is difficult to state conclusively what
the exact wording of a final endorsement test might be. However, Justice O'Connor has articulated it as follows:
The question under endorsement analysis, in short, is whether a reasonable observer would view such longstanding
[governmental] practices as a disapproval of his or her particular religious choices, in light of the fact that [the governmental practices] serve a secular purpose rather than a sectarian
one and have largely lost their religious significance over
time?'

If the facts of the Nakaya case were to be analyzed under this
standard, the main question would appear to be whether the
actions of the Regional Office served to promote Shinto and/or
disapprove of Christianity.''' It would appear that the Regional Office's exclusive focus on Shinto would weigh heavily
against the constitutionality of its actions. There is no indication, however, that the Nakaya court would have necessarily
reached the opposite conclusion under this standard. In fact,
the holding that the Regional Office's exclusive focus on Shinto
did not constitute propagation of that religion might indicate
that the outcome of Nakaya would remain unchanged under
the endorsement analysis.
C. Comparative Analysis Under the Utah Constitution

It is also interesting to compare Nakaya to a Utah case
addressing very similar issues. In Society of Separationists v.
Whitehead,'" the Utah Supreme Court held that some governmental clerical assistance may be provided to facilitate
activities that are religious in nature without violating Utah's
constitutional guarantee of separation of church and state.'02
99. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 631 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Comor has also stated that the standard "preclude[s] government
from conveying or attempting to convey a message that religion or a particular
religious belief is favored or preferred." Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 70 (1985)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
100. This formulation of the inquiry is reinforced by Justice O'Connor's statement that "the term 'endorsement' is closely linked to the term 'promotion' . . . ."
492 US. a t 593.
101. 870 P.2d 916.
102. Article one, section four of the Utah Constitution states:
The rights of conscience shall never be infringed. The State shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the fkee exercise
thereof; no religious test shall be required as a qualification for any office
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In Whitehead, the Salt Lake City Council was sued by a
separationist group seeking to enjoin the City Council's practice
of inviting members of various religious groups to offer prayers
or personal thoughts before the commencement of its public
meetings. This practice was governed by several procedures.
First, the city council's staff was required to mail letters to a
wide variety of churches and other civic organizations every six
months in order to inform them of the city council's practice
and invite them to participate. The staff was also responsible
for the scheduling of requests to participate in the brief ceremony. Secondly, the staff was required to keep a list of those who
participated and to provide that list to the city attorney and
other officials biannually.lo3 The Utah Supreme Court held
that the clerical activities necessitated by this practice were not
violative of the state constitutional guarantee. Thus, as with
Nakaya, government entities were permitted to use government
time, personnel, and funds to support religious activities.
Both the Nakaya court and the Utah Supreme Court relied
on the facts of the individual case in determining the extent of
government involvement. The determination of the extent of
government involvement is factual: the legal question is where
the line should be drawn between permissible and impermissible government involvement. Although neither court set forth
an identifiable bright line, a comparison of each court's analysis
of the facts of its case sheds some light on where such a line
should be drawn.
The actions of the Japanese Regional Office were somewhat similar to those of the Salt Lake City Council staff. Both
government offices drafted procedures for the handling of a
religious activity, both were designated as the repositories for
the documentation necessary to conduct the activity, and both
solicited information from religious sources. There are some
significant differences, however. The Salt Lake City Council

of public trust or for any vote at any election; nor shall any person be
incompetent as a witness or juror on account of religious belief or the
absence thereof. There shall be no union of Church and State, nor shall
any church dominate the State or inteTfere with its finctions. No public
money or property shall be appropriated for or applied to any religious
worship, exercise or instruction, or for the support of any ecclesiastical
establishment. No property qualification shall be required of any person to
vote, or hold office, except as provided in this Constitution.
UTAHCONST. art. I, 5 4 (emphasis added).
103. Whitehead, 870 P.2d at 918 n.2.
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staff was careful to solicit the participation of a broad range of
diverse religious organizations. The Japanese Veterans Association, on the other hand, obtained clerical help from the Regional Office in order to promote a religious activity unique to a
particular religion. The Veterans Association's stated purpose
for the enshrinement was to raise the morale and social status
of SDF members.lo4
There was evidence, however, that both the Regional Office
and the Veterans Association were only interested in raising
morale through a Shinto ritual. After the enshrinement, a
member of the Regional Office staff told Mrs. Nakaya that "it
was natural to deify Takafumi in the shrine because he had
died for the State."lo5 On another occasion a staff member
stated that "Gokoku Shrine is an official religion so that the
Japanese national, regardless of religions of their families,
should be officially deified to Gokoku Shrine."lOGThese statements indicate that at least some members of the Regional
Office Staff were focused exclusively on a Shinto enshrinement
to raise the status and morale of SDF members. Although
these statements were reviewed by the court, they did not
convince it to hold that the actions were unconstitutional.
Thus, the Nakaya court permitted government involvement
that favored a particular religion.
It appears that government actions such as those taken by
the Salt Lake City Council in Whitehead would also be permissible under the Nakaya standard. It is highly questionable
however, whether the reverse would be true. In Whitehead, the
Utah Supreme Court gave substantial weight to the fact that
the city council solicited input from varied groups and not only
from those of the majority religion.'" Thus, the determina104. The Nakaya court found that "the Regional Office had hoped for the enshrinement of the dead SDF members in order to improve the social status of SDF
members and to raise their morale." Jzufgment on the Enshrinement, supra note 2,
a t 21.
105. Id. at 24. On another occasion a staff member informed Mrs. Nakaya that
the reason the SDF officers were enshrined was to insure "that dead SDF members who were killed while on duty would be ranked as highly as loyal retainer [of
past wars] and that they had been deified so as to make SDF members in active
service proud of their life and death." Id.; see also FIELD,supra note 41, a t 250
(discussing speeches made by Regional Office members immediately following the
enshrinement).
106. Judgment on the Enshrinement, supra note 2, a t 24.
107. See Whitehead, 870 P.2d a t 918-19, 938-39. In drafting the procedures, the
City Council relied on Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983), and Stein v.
Plainwell Community Sch., 822 F.2d 1406, 1410 (5th Cir. 1987), taking steps to
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tion of the type and nature of permissible government actions
established in Nakaya seems to be less strict than the analysis
adopted by the Utah Supreme Court in whitehead.lo8

A. The Problem of Religious Acculturation
The degree to which religion becomes integrated into a
people's social and cultural consciousness can significantly
affect the constitutional review of government actions in the
religious realm. This problem of religious acculturation is particularly important in Japan.
Both the Nakaya and Lemon tests require a threshold
finding that the activity a t issue is "religious" in nature. Difficulties in making this determination arise where inherently
religious activities are culturally ingrained in a particular community or event, thus creating an overlap of culture and religion. As a result, it is often difficult for courts to determine
where culture ends and religion begins. Because the Nakaya
court's "divisiveness" analysis places substantial weight on the
public perception of a given government action, the acculturation of religion necessarily plays a large role in Japanese religious-freedom jurisprudence.

ensure that the prayers or comments were nondenominational and did not attempt
to proselytize or prefer one religion over another.
In addressing the propriety of the government preferring one religion over
another, the Utah Supreme Court stated:
In Utah, these lessons were learned a t a steep price. We think that the
drafters of the Utah Constitution achieved a remarkable degree of detachment from the passions that had swirled around them in the years preceding 1895, and wisely concluded that it was best to maintain neutrality
among various religious groups as well as between those whose consciences were persuaded by religion and those whose consciences were not.
Whitehead, 870 P.2d at 940 (citation omitted).
108. Three of the justices in Nakaya, however, found the adopted standard
slightly troublesome. Although concurring in the judgment, they stated that while
"the [statements of the Regional Office members] in themselves have nothing to do
with the infringement alleged by the Appellee . . ." they "may cause suspicion
against their religious neutrality and should be considered overdone." Judgment on
the Enshrinement, supra note 2, a t 24 (Takashima, Yotsuya, and Okuno, JJ., concurring). A fourth justice, reflecting on some of the post-enshrinement speeches
given by Regional Office members, called them "inappropriate" and stated that the
officials "should have exercised more self-restrain[tLn Id. at 21-22 (Nagashima, J.,
concurring).
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1. Culture vs. religion: What constitutes religious activity in
Japan?
Because Japan's culture is so deeply rooted in Shinto, it is
ofken difficult to separate Japanese culture from Japanese
religion. Some rituals and rites of passage have become so
commonly accepted that they are considered cultural events or
customs and have nearly lost their religious connotation^.'^^
Other rituals, such as formal Shinto purification rites, lie near
the other end of the spectrum-they continue to be undeniably
religious in nature even though they are commonly practiced by
a majority of the Japanese population. In many situations,
however, the distinction between cultural and religious activities is less clear because of the high level of acculturation of
Shinto in modern Japanese society.
Scholars of Japanese religion have debated the question of
what constitutes a religious activity for some time. One such
debate occurred between Ian Reader and Richard Anderson
involving the question of whether the ritual of offering an emu
a t a Shinto shrine constituted a religious activity. An emu is a
tablet sold a t a Shinto shrine that is often engraved with a
request, in the form of a prayer, for a particular favor from the
gods. The ema is purchased and offered to the Shrine.''' In
one example of a typical emu ritual, a student visits a local
shrine (one does not need to travel very far to find one in Japan; shrines dot not only the cities, but the countryside as well)
and purchases an ema with an engraving that requests help

109. One example of this phenomenon is the Japanese custom of placing pine
branches and a mandarin orange above a door (a kadomatsu) to welcome the New
Year. This practice has roots in Shintoism, but has lost virtually all of its religious
meaning.
Another example, which is Buddhist in origin, is the Dharma doll (daruma
ningyou). A Dharma doll is a round figure with a large face and two large, round
eyes. A person purchases a Dharma doll and blacks in one eye, making a personal
goal. When the goal is accomplished, the person colors in the other eye to mark its
completion. This ritual has deep roots in Buddhism. Dharma was a Buddhist monk
who was said to have lost both arms and legs due to lack of use as he sat in the
lotus position seeking an understanding of enlightenment (hence the round shape
of the doll). The basic messagethe importance of endurance-has virtually
eclipsed any purely religious meaning associated with the ritual.
As stated previously, courts in the United States have had many occasions to
deal with similar situations, the most comparable seem to be the cases involving
the public display of creches.
110. For a more complete description of the emu ritual, see Ian Reader, Letters
J. RELIGIOUS
STUJI. 23
to the Gods: The Form and Meaning of Ema, 18 JAPANESE
(1991).
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with an important examination. The student then offers the
emu at the shrine. This involves a quick prayer1" before the
shrine and a presentation of the emu.'" From a Western perspective, the emu ritual would appear to be unquestionably
religious, rather than purely c~ltural.''~For the Japanese,
however, the ritual's mixed historical, cultural, and religious
associations make the distinction more problematic.
Ian Reader argues that the historical merger of religion
and culture does not render the ritual nonreligious; in spite of
this merger the ritual can only be described as "religious behavior."'14 Reader bases this determination on the fact that
the ritual is "performed in a religious center" and that it uses
"forms of behavior . . . that are generally accepted elements in
the religious action of worship and prayer."'15 Additionally,
the emu is purchased and deposited at the Shrine and the inscription on the emu is addressed to the gods.
Richard Anderson,'16 on the other hand, argues that the
Japanese do not see the ema ritual as religious. He asserts that
informal conversations with patrons of Shinto shrines show
that the "vast majority" do not categorize the inscription of ema
as "religion" (shuukyou) or as a "belief" (shinkou).'" Instead,
he reports that the majority would describe the ritual as "custom" or "habit" (~huukan)."~
These obsemations suggest that
111. A Shinto prayer typically consists of ringing a bell to wake the gods,
pressing the hands together in a position of respect and bowing slightly forward.
At the conclusion of the prayer, the worshiper claps twice.
112. The ema is donated to the shrine and many shrines have a special gallery dedicated to the emu offerings.
113. Not surprisingly, many Japanese Christians appear to share this perception. In questioning several native Japanese Christians, all felt that the ritual did
not fit within the acceptable realm of Christian religious conduct. On the other
hand, all agreed that there was no Christian religious objection to the use of
kadomatsu or Dharma dolls. See supra note 109. While this informal poll cannot
be considered statistically accurate, it indicates that to at least some Christians in
Japan, there is a definite distinction between religious and cultural rituals.
114. Ian Reader, What Constitutes Religious Activity? (II), 18 JAPANESE
J. RELIGIOUS STUD. 373, 375 (1991).
115. Id.
116. Mr. Anderson describes himself as "a folklorist [who is] interested in
modern Japanese society." Richard W. Anderson, What Constitutes Religious Activity? (I
18
)
JAPANESE
,
J. OF RELIGIOUSSTUD.367, 367 (1991).
117. Id.
118. Id. Mr. Anderson's theory is subject to the same limitations as my informal poll. See supra note 113. I t is possible to reconcile the results because both
polls are inherently biased. My poll focused on a small minority group-Japanese
Christians-who felt the erna ritual was religious. Mr. Anderson's poll questioned
people visiting the shrine, a group likely to represent the majority of Japanese who
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the emu ritual has become so common that it has lost its religious meaning to the majority of the Japanese populace.
Ironically, both scholars are probably correct in their basic
assumptions. While the religious overtones of the ritual are
very apparent, a large part of the Japanese population seems
to ignore the religious nature of the activity because they are
highly accustomed to the practice. Using Mr. Anderson's labels,
it is possible that most Japanese see those who make and sell
emu as "artists" rather than "priests" and the ritual itself as
"custom" rather than "religious activity."'"
2.

The problem of confusing culture with acculturated religion

a. Manifestations of the problem in Japan. Mr. Anderson
further asserts that an emu cannot be a religious item because
he knows a restaurateur who hangs them on the wall and
occasionally gives them as gifts to his patrons.'20 Mr. Reader
counters that were crucifixes used in the same way, it would
not negate their inherently religious nature.12' Some might
suggest that Mr. Reader's argument-that acculturation does
not deprive religious acts of their religiosity4nly demonstrates the difference between the Western and Japanese views
of religion. However, this argument ignores the problem faced
in Nakaya. The danger in the implications of Mr. Anderson's
viewpoint lies in ignoring the Japanese inclination to label an
intrinsically religious activity as "culture" because it is a common practice, thus opening the door to government endorsement of the majority's religious activities (to the detriment of
minority religions) on the assumption that such activities are
merely a manifestation of national culture.
The problem presented by acculturation of religious activities into a dominant culture has also been discussed by Angela
Carmella. Ms. Carmella suggests that such assimilation is a
phenomenon common to the majority of religious tradit i o n ~ . 'She
~ ~ also suggests that theological analysis should be

practice some form of Shinto and thus perform the emu ritual. This majority sees
the ritual as a part of their customary routine.
119. Id. at 369, 371.
120. Id. at 371.
121. Reader, supra note 114, at 375.
122. Angela C. Carmella, A Theological Critique of Free Exercise Jurisprudence,
60 GEO. W M .L. REV. 782, 785 (1992).
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relevant to legal decision-making.123In the United States, the
courts strongly discourage any inquiries into the doctrinal validity of religious activities or into their relative degree of nel ~ ~ is a well-accepted and
cessity in a theological ~ 0 n t e x t . This
necessary safeguard to ensure the autonomy of religious beliefs
and to protect the dignity of religions. Some courts have tried
to protect the integrity and dignity of religions by evaluating
the religious activity in question from the position of a "neutral
observer." Ms. Carmella suggests that "the neutral observer
misses entirely the reality of acculturation and calls 'secular'
those religious activities that do not look sectarian, radical, or
counter-~ultural."'~~
For example, one might assume that the
performance of Shinto burial rites has only cultural significance
and ignore the theological implications of those rites for a nonbeliever, dismissing her valid constitutional objections as irrelevant.
b. The Utah Supreme Court's treatment of the problem. One effective approach to the problem of acculturation of
religious activities is illustrated by the Utah Supreme Court
case discussed above, Society of Separationists u. Whitehead.126The State of Utah faces cultural circumstances somewhat analogous to those of Japan. As a result of its unique
history,127Utah has a high concentration of Mormon inhabita n t ~ and
' ~ ~consequently has a correspondingly high level of
religious acculturation that can sometimes blur the line be~ ~addressing the relitween the religious and the c ~ l t u r a 1 . lIn
123. Id. a t 793-95.
124. See, e.g., Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth
Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449-50 (1969) (refusing to
evaluate and make factual findings concerning the fundamental tenets of church
doctrines); Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church in
N. Am., 344 U.S. 94, 11416 (1952) (stating that U.S. constitutional jurisprudence
prohibits state interference in matters of church doctrine); United States v. Ballard,
322 U.S. 78, 85-88 (1944) (holding that religion itself cannot be the subject of trial).
125. Carmella, supra note 122, a t 793.
126. 870 P.2d 916 (Utah 1993).
127. Utah was settled primarily by Mormon pioneers who were seeking a new
home after being driven out of several states in the eastern and central United
States. For a brief history of its settlement and government, see id. at 921-29.
128. The official name of the Mormon Church is The Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints.
129. The differences between Japan and Utah, however, should also be emphasized. Japan is culturally and ethnically isolated while Utah is part of a culturally
and ethnically diverse nation. Utah also has a much higher percentage of minority
religions and cultures than does Japan. Accordingly, Utah is subject to stronger
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giosity of nondenominational prayer at City Council meetings,
the Utah Supreme Court held that a prayer addressed to God
did constitute a religious activity. However, it distinguished
prayers and references to God on American currency and in
other public places from Christmas carols, reasoning that the
latter, when "sung apart from a formalized worship service, on
or off church property . . . are simply artistic expressions of a
predominantly Christian culture. The same is true of any number of other artistic expressions that have occupied center stage
in Western European civilization for more than 1500
years."130 This distinction takes into consideration the religious history of the community when determining whether an
activity is merely cultural or essentially religious. The approach serves to protect the religious and cultural interests of
the majority. It also ensures that truly religious activities of
the majority, in this case those who believe in God, are properly labeled as religious and thus not endorsed by the government, even though the conduct is highly acculturated in the
community.
In summary, when religion is highly acculturated, the
method of analysis applied by courts must ensure that those
aspects of the traditional culture that have some religious association are not confused with true religious activity. The courts
must protect non-assimilated religious minorities from subtle
domination and oppression by a religious majority whose beliefs are highly acculturated. Failure to account for religious
acculturation can present a court with two potential problems.
First, it may cause the court to refuse to recognize that an
inherently religious activity is indeed religious simply because
it consists of conduct that is arguably "cultural." Second, it may
lead a court to deny appropriate constitutional protection to a
majority religion simply because its activities are highly
acculturated and the court fails to appropriately characterize
the behavior as "religious." The Japanese Supreme Court
should consider, as the Utah Supreme Court did, the underlying motivations, purpose, and nature of such actions when
determining whether or not they are truly "religious."

internal and external influences from minority concerns. This implies that if the
acculturation of religion were ignored in both places, Japan's minorities will have
comparatively less support and protection from non-judicial sources.
130. Society of Separationists, 870 P.2d at 932.
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B. Japanese Culture's Effect on Free Exercise Jurisprudence.
1. The problem of personal rights: Making waves in Japanese
society

Religious acculturation is not the only social factor significantly affecting religious freedoms in Japan. The court's rejection of Mrs. Nakaya's claim of a personal religious right suggests another issue that should be considered by the Japanese
Supreme Court: the apparent reluctancy of Japanese citizens to
avoid enforcing individual rights through judicial action. The
ideals of cooperation and harmony pervade almost every aspect
of modern Japanese society, and the ever-present corollary to
these ideas is the inclination to sacrifice individual interests for
the benefit of the larger group.131Perhaps in no other highlydeveloped country does the idea of the group play such a strong
r01e.l~~
This is not to say that Japanese individuals are unwilling to think for themselves-this would clearly be incorrect.
It is simply to recognize that Japan evidences an exceptionally
strong cultural pressure to conform.

131. At the turn of the century, one Japanese scholar commented:
[Ilndividuals are not believed to exist for and of themselves as autonomous entities; only the state does. In Japan, state sovereignty is heavengranted while individual rights are bestowed by the state. The state allows limited individual rights to the extent that they further the aims of
the state. Thus, individual rights are always instruments of the state, not
to be utilised for the aims of the individual. While in the West individual
rights are thought to be granted by heaven and thus inalienable . . .
respect for individual rights and individual identity in the West is inconceivable for the Japanese, just as Japanese respect of state sovereignty
and the state is inconceivable for Westerners.
VAN WOLFEREN,
supra note 9, at 209-10 (quoting HAJIME KAWAKAMI,
KAWAKAMI
HAJIMECHOSAKUSHU
[COLLECTED
WORKSOF HAJIMEKAWAKAMI]
190 (1964)).
132. The Japanese ideal of communal unity of thought and action is best expressed by the word wa. W a is not easily translated into any single English word,
but the word harmony may be the best one-word translation. The words of one
Japanese official give more insight into its meaning:
Japan's history is much different from that of the United States. . . .
Today, as in the old days, the basic unit of Japanese society is not "atomistic" individuals, but "molecule-like" groups. . . . The fundamental
ethic which supports a group has been "harmony." Such American values
as individual freedom, equality, equal opportunity, and an open-door policy can be considered "foreign proteins" introduced into the traditional
body of Japanese society.
FFLWK K. UPHAM, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGEI N POSTWAR
JAPAN
205-06 (1987)
AN
(quoting retired MITI official Amaya Naohiro); see also H A R M BEN, JAPAN:
ANTHROPOLOGICAL
INTRODUCTION
166-170 (1971).
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This pressure contributes to the scarcity of lawyers in
Japan. Japanese lawyers have not obtained the relatively high
social status that their counterparts in the United States have.
This is partly because the Japanese tend to avoid any kind of
public dispute. In fact, there is much "cultural dislike" of lawyers and the court system in general.13 In the interest of
"maintaining harmony,"134 the Japanese bring between onetwentieth and one-tenth as many cases as their Western neighb o r ~ . 'Some
~ ~ scholars have even suggested that government
limitations on the number of lawyers, public veneration of the
virtues of homogeneity,ls6 and judicial denial of individual
rights combine to preserve the current authority structure of
133. VAN WOLFEREN,supra note 9, a t 246.
134. Id. at 213. A Japanese government training manual contained the following statement:
The organisational climate that makes possible this kind of groupism
peculiar to our country stems from our national traditions, from the fact
that our country consists of a homogeneous race, which is rare in the
world, and from the fact that we go about our lives while mutually grasping one another's feelings, fearing confrontation, regarding 'harmony as
noble,' mutually restraining ourselves, and aligning ourselves to the
thoughts and actions of people in the group.
Id. a t 314 (quoting Chiho Jichi Kenkyu Shiryo Sentaa, Gendai Kanrisharon [MODERN MANAGEMENT]22 (1977)).
135. TANAKA,supra note 11, at 255. Even with the relatively low number of
cases, it is often difficult for the Japanese to obtain a lawyer because of their
scarcity, especially in rural areas. ODA, supra note 14, a t 102-03; cf: John 0.
Haley, The Myth of the Reluctant Litigant, 4 J. JAPANESE
STUD.359-90 (1978)
(asserting that the low level of litigation is a t least as much the result of institutional arrangements as of cultural restraints).
136. Unfortunately, the veneration of homogeneity can lead to bigotry and intolerance for those that do not conform to the same cultural, social, and racial ideals. A 1983-84 survey showed that over 80% of the Japanese surveyed felt that
they were one of the "superior races in the world." William Wetherall, Nakasone
Promotes Pride and Prejudice, FAR E. ECON.REV., 19 Feb. 1987, at 87.
This supremacist dynamic also manifests itself in the shockingly racist statements of some government officials. Former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone,
addressing the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan, stated that "Japan has an 'intelligent society' because 'in America there are many Blacks, Puerto Ricans and M&icans.'
Id. It is also telling that of the fifty-some-odd reporters covering the address, only
two found this statement worth mentioning in their reports. See VAN WOLFEREN,
supra note 9, a t 267-68.
The glorification of Japanese homogeneity has even spurred a new and popular
genre of literature. Nihonjinron ["theory on what is Japanese"] extols the virtue of
Japanese uniqueness and often speaks of the superiority of the Japanese race. For
UNIQUEworks addressing this issue, see PETERN. DALE, THE MYTH OF JAPANESE
NESS (1986); VAN WOLFEREN, supm note 9, a t 263-72; Paul Lansing & Tamra
Domeyer, Japan's Attempt a t Internationalization and Its Lack of Sensitivity to
Minority Issues, 22 C&. W. IN'i"L L.J. 135 (1991-92); John Lie, The Discriminated
Fingers: The Rorean Minority in Japan, 38 MONTHLYREV. 17 (1987).
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Japan.13' Karel Van Wolferen, a scholar of Japanese politics,
suggests that "if Japan were to use the law as it is used in the
Western democracies, and as it is supposed to be used under
the Japanese constitution, the present Japanese authority
structure would ~ollapse."'~~
This problem is compounded because of the foreign origin
of the present Japanese constitution. As previously discussed,
the Constitution of Japan is not only a product of Japanese
~~
the
scholars and politicians, but also of A m e r i ~ a n s . 'When
Constitution of Japan was accepted by the Japanese Diet,
many politicians made much of the fact that the new constitu~
critics of the
tion was primarily a foreign d o ~ u m e n t . 'Today,
Constitution of Japan rally around this point, demanding that
many provisions of the new constitution be removed."' However overstated this complaint may be, it is clear that many
modern Japanese legal concepts, including the concept of individual human rights, are of foreign origin. The foreignness of
modern Japanese law has resulted in an uncomfortable incongruity between legal and social norms that makes many Japanese reluctant to abandon cultural expectations in order to

137. VAN WOLFEREN,
supra note 9, at 212; see also UPHAM,supra note 132, a t
205-21.
supra note 9, a t 212.
138. VAN WOLFEREN,
139. It should be noted that Japan has a strong civil law tradition, stemming
from its adaptation of German codes in the late 1800s. The Constitution of Japan
and other legal influences later introduced an overlay of common law in the postWorld War I1 occupation period. When considering that these legal traditions overlay a considerably older system of social control based on custom and cultural
sanctions (consisting of shinto and buddhist philosophy, the warrior code
(bushidou), and other cultural traditions), common law judicial interpretation is
indeed a "new" idea to the Japanese. See JOHN H. MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW
TRADI'I'ION 1-5 (2d ed. 1985); see also RALPH PIDDINGTON,AN INTRODUCTION
TO
SOCIALANTHROPOLOGY
319-355 (2d ed. 1952) (discussing law and custom in selected primitive societies and showing that law and custom both serve to maintain soSTRUCTUREAND FFWMEWORK IN PRIMITIVE
cial control); kR. RADCLIFFE-BROWN,
SOCIETY205-11 (1965) (introducing the role and nature of social sanctions in culture); TANAKA,supra note 11, at 59 (explaining that custom or "customary law"
(kanshuu hou) may have a strong legal force in modern Japan).
140. After several amendments, the Constitution of Japan was nearly unanimously accepted by the Japanese Diet. TANAKA,supra note 11, at 665. However
"many claimed that it was a constitution imported from the United States." Id.
141. Not surprisingly, restoring the emperor to the position of head of state is
one of the most common demands. Ultraconservative political groups and other
dissenters make much of the foreign origin of the Constitution in advancing these
arguments. See id. a t 665-66.
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assert legal rights that are not a traditional part of the Japanese psyche.142
Professor Tatsuo Inoue suggests that Japan has "an urgent
need to heed the voice that calls for increased respect for individual rights."'& Specifically mentioning the Nakaya case,
Professor Inoue suggests that the court's admonitions of tolerance are evidence of the cultural imperative to onf form.'^
The Justices of the Nakaya court were not the only ones to
emphasize the need for conformity. Mrs. Nakaya's stance
proved to be unpopular with much of the Japanese public, and
she has paid a price for going against the grain of Japanese
~ 0 c i e t y . It
l ~ is
~ unlikely that the court will consider a shift to
individual rights without a struggle-socially
and
governmentally protected cultural norms will not easily be
replaced by new ~ a 1 u e s . l ~ ~

2. Viability of the religious personal right claim
Social and cultural assumptions clearly played a major role
in the Nakaya court's decision, but the court's reluctance to accept Mrs. Nakaya's free-exercise assertion may also be attributed to other, more judicially legitimate, public policy concerns.
First, the establishment of a "personal religious right"
might potentially subject the Japanese courts to frivolous
claims. Permitting individual citizens to bring legal action
every time the government does something that offends their
personal religious beliefs could open the proverbial "flood-gates

142. See id. a t 665-68; UPHAM, supra note 132, at 7-16.
143. Tatsuo Inoue, The Poverty of Rights-Blind Communality: Looking Through
the Window of Japan, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 517, 531.
144. Yoichi Higuchi, one of the leading constitutional lawyers in Japan, also
referring to the Nakaya case, suggested that "[mlajority opinions that treat a
shrine's freedom of religion as equivalent to that of the plaintiff, and require the
exercise of mutual 'tolerance,' actually give the shrine's rights precedence over
those of individuals. Higuchi Yoichi, "When Society Is Itself the Tyrant," 35 JAPAN
Q. 350, 354 (1988).
145. Much of the anger directed at Mrs. Nakaya has come in the form of letters. See FIELD, supra note 41, at 134. One letter contained defaced newspaper
photographs of Mrs. Nakaya, carrying captions such as: 'You are possessed by the
spirit of death! You are not a woman! You are a human demon on this earth!" Id.
Typical letters read somewhat like the following: "'If you don't like the verdict, get
out! Go to a "Christian country," a "foreign country"'; You aren't Jewish by any
chance are you?'; 'Hairy barbarian!'; 'Get off Japanese soil, unclean thing!'" Id. a t
135, 212.
146. See UP-,
supra note 132, at 205-21 (suggesting that group ideology
provides the basic framework for the entire Japanese bureaucracy).
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of litigation." A standard providing that a person has a right
not to be offended by the religious beliefs or practices of another is problematic. Professor William Marshall suggests that
"religious sensibilities . . . do not merit special deference under
the Constitution [of the United States] and cannot, in any
event, possibly be shielded from offense in a complex society."14' Because religious beliefs vary widely and often diametrically oppose each other, it is impossible to allow diverse
religious beliefs to coexist in a public forum without requiring
religious adherents to show tolerance and accommodation of
each other's beliefs. In order to protect the religious interests of
all Japanese people, there must be some degree of tolerance
toward the beliefs and practices of others, including the majority, even if the result is sometimes painful to individual sensibilities.
Second, recognition of Mrs. Nakaya's claim of a personal
religious right could present overly burdensome administrative
obstacles for the free exercise of those religions whose practices
involve prayers or ordinances for members of other religions.'" If the court were to recognize a cause of action to enforce a personal religious right, it might require the express
permission of family members of the deceased as a prerequisite
to performing such prayers or ordinances. While the vast majority of these religions would comply with such regulations,
compliance would create an administrative burden that might
infringe the right of such religions to practice their beliefs or
fulfill duties they view as religious imperatives.
Third, the recognition of a personal religious right could
also foreseeably infiinge on the constitutional rights of those
religions that proselytize in Japan. If individuals were afforded

147. William P. Marshall, The Concept of Offensiveness in Establishment and
Free Exercise Jurisprudence, 66 IND. L.J. 351, 363 (1990-91). Mr. Marshall suggests
that because of the problems inherent in standards based on offensiveness, "the
infusion of an offensiveness component into religion clause jurisprudence is inappropriate and should be eliminated." Id. at 353. He suggests that religious freedoms
should be treated as freedom of speech is, with minimal regard to the personal
offense of the listener.
148. For example, it is the practice of members of the Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-Day Saints to perform proxy baptisms in the names of deceased individuals of all religions. Latter-day Saints believe that the proxy baptism may be accepted or rejected by the deceased in the afterlife or "spirit world." Thus, the ordinance differs somewhat from Shinto enshrinement in that it presents an "option"
for the deceased rather than defining the nature of the deceased through a religious title.
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the right not to have their peaceful religious enjoyment disturbed by a potentially offensive religious message, the free
speech rights of those people who share their religions through
missionary work might be infringed.'" This would have farreaching repercussions on the rights of proselyting religions
such as the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, Seventh Day Adventists, Jehovah's Witnesses, Sokka-Gakkai, and
many others.
In any event, any claim to a personal religious right faces a
difficult road to acceptance. As discussed above, it has been
suggested that in Japan the need for cultural harmony too
often comes "at the expense of individual rights."150 While
constitutional language emphasizes the rights of individuals,
courts have consistently emphasized the rights of the
Accordingly, many Japanese would rather deal with
infringements of their rights than face the social stigmatization
that often visits those who choose to stand alone in a group
culture.
VII. CONCLUSION
Despite the cultural differences between the two countries,
the current state of religious freedom in Japan appears to have
some significant similarities to religious freedom in the United
States. Article Twenty of the Constitution of Japan contains
clauses analogous to the Establishment Clause and the Free
Exercise Clause in the United States Constitution. Furthermore, in hearing only two cases dealing with the issue of religious freedom, the Japanese Supreme Court has designed an
establishment standard not highly dissimilar from its American
counterpart, the product of a much longer history of scrutiny
and evolution.
The Institutional Guarantee in the Constitution of Japan
serves as an assurance of the separation of religion and state.
In determining whether government actions violate this clause,
149. Applicable provisions of the Constitution of Japan include Articles 19 and
21. Article 19 reads "Freedom of thought and conscience shall not be violated."
Article 21 reads "Freedom of assembly and association as well as speech, press and
all other forms of expression are guaranteed. . . . No censorship shall be maintained, nor shall the secrecy of any means of communication be violated." KENPOU
[Constitution] arts. XIX, XXI (Japan).
150. Dean J. Gibbons, Law and the Group Ethos in Japan, 3 INT'L LEGAL
PERSPECTIVES 98, 119 (1990).
151. Id.; UPHAM,supra note 132, at 205-21.
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courts must first decide if the actions are religious in nature,
then determine the extent of the government involvement. The
Japanese Supreme Court has stated that only activities whose
effect is to promote, facilitate, accelerate, oppress or intervene
in a religion are violative of the Constitution. In making this
determination, courts appear to have substantial freedom to set
their own standards, but the Nakaya court has specifically
mentioned that the existence of a secular purpose, the nature
of the activity, the extent of government entanglement, and the
evaluation of the public are valid considerations. The Nakaya
court's second inquiry focuses on the nature and extent of the
actions of the governmental agency. Nakaya holds that indirect
government involvement-particularly that which is only clerical in nature-is
not automatically prohibited by the
Constitution's Institutional Guarantee. However, courts might
apply stricter scrutiny to government actions that appear to be
directly collaborative with private organizations involved in
religious activities. Finally, it appears that the Japanese Supreme Court will allow slightly more cooperation in religious
activities from the government than its American counterpart
will.
In the end, however, the Nakaya standard would afford
solid protection to the people of Japan only if the courts are
aware of the pitfalls inherent in giving great weight and consideration to the public perception of state activity. The courts
must be sensitive to the normative effects of acculturation and
the potential for oppression by a majority religion in order to
effectively protect the religious freedoms of all of its citizens.
As for the free exercise of religion, the Japanese Supreme
Court has stated that there is no legal right to live one's life
under a quiet and undisturbed religious atmosphere. The court
has placed a strong emphasis on the need to be tolerant of the
views of others and appears to be wary of religious freedom
claims that reach beyond mere protection from religious compulsion or disadvantage. Because the protection here closely
parallels that of the Institutional Guarantee, it appears that
this standard could provide adequate protection of religious
freedoms. However, the apparent disdain for personal rights
raises serious questions as to whether a free exercise claim will
ever be fully recognized by the Japanese Supreme Court. It
also raises questions as to how much time will pass before
another individual will be bold enough to assert their religious
rights before the courts. It is interesting $0 note that this time
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the brave soul was a seemingly simple widow from rural Japan. By asserting her beliefs, Mrs. Nakaya paid a high personal price for going against the cultural norms of Japanese society. However, she has renewed the examination of religion's
place in Japanese culture. Nakaya was heard a decade after
Tsu City and the years have again mounted since this most
recent decision was handed down. Because of Mrs. Nakaya's
courage, perhaps another decade will not have to pass before
the discussion is taken up again.
Eric N. Weeks

